An Economic Analysis of Factor Usage and Workplace Regulation: Comment*

I. Introduction
In a recent article in this Journal, Elder [I] examines the impact of workplace safety regula tions upon a firm's input choices. His theoretical model, which treats accidents in the work place as a by-product of production, shows that increases in safety are obtained at the expense of reduced output and altered factor usage. The results are empirically supported using state by state data for 1971 and 1976 where factor usage is regressed on factor returns and workers' compensation payments. When combined with work by Russell [2] and Viscusi [3] showing rather small benefits from safety regulation, Elder's work raises important ques tions about the social desirability of workplace regulation as implemented in the U.S.
We agree with Elder's general conclusions, but we find that the derivation of his theoretical results contain some errors. The purpose of this paper is to re-examine Elder's model and to illustrate how his theoretical model should have been developed.
II. Reexamination of the Model
Following Elder, we consider the case of a competitive firm that employs labor and capital to produce its output. The objective function of the profit maximizing firm can be defined by max rr =pX(K,L)-CaL-rK-wL-bSL, (I) where rr = profit, x = output, p = output price, K = capital, L = labor, a = accident rate, C = cost per accident, w = wage rate, r = capital return rate, b = price of safety, and S = safety expenditures. Accidents, A = aL, are modeled as a by-product of production, depending upon labor usage and the accident rate.
1 They are treated as a cost of production that can be reduced through safety expenditures. Hence, assume that:
The assumption w" = 0 is implicit in Elder's analysis. It can be relaxed so that w" > 0 without affecting any of the qualitative results.
2 Intuitively, w > 0 seems likely since an increasing rate of accidents should increase workers' perceptions of risk.
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I. In his footnote 3, Elder mentions that this problem could also be modeled in a joint production framework, which is, "in fact, more intuitively appealing." Alternatively, the problem could be examined using a three-factor model where safety is the third factor of production. Elder's basic results would remain the same, but we feel this may be a more descriptive way of modeling the problem, especially since Elder already implicitly assumes the existence of safety as a factor of production.
2. Elder does not mention that w" = 0. However, his equation (7) A necessary consequence of the profit maximization problem is that the first order partial derivatives of (I) equal zero,
Notice that our equation ( 4) differs from Elder's specification which reads as arrI as = -CLa'-L(w'fa') = 0 [1, 317, eq. (4)].
Assuming that the production function, X = X (K, L), is strictly concave implies that the second order derivatives satisfy XKK < 0, XLL < 0, and (XKKXLL -x;L) > 0. 3 Suffi cient conditions also require that the second order partial derivatives satisfy rr;; < 0, for i = K, L, S. 4 Then, the first order conditions can be solved for the optimal levels of factor usage,
We next examine the effect of changes in worker's compensation payments, as approxi mated by C, on factor usage. The first order conditions are totally differentiated and Cramer's rule is used to solve for aKj ac, aLj ac and as; ac as follows:
where p(XKKXLL-x;L) > 0 and [a"(C+w')+(a') 2 w"] > 0 for profit maximization. As suming that capital and labor are complementary, i.e., XKL > 0, from (5), we obtain aKj ac < 0.
6 Furthermore, from (6) and (7), we obtain aLj ac < 0, as; ac > 0. In other words, an increase in worker's compensation will increase safety investment and decrease the use of both capital and labor. Elder obtains this result by assuming that w" = 0. We find the same result occurs in the more general case w" > 0.
If safety regulation is introduced (as a binding constraint), the regulated level of safety investment (SR) exceeds the optimal level of safety investment (S*). Compliance with regu lations is assumed so that S= SR. 5. Note that optimal levels of K, LandS are not a function of w. w is already endogenous, w = w (a(S)). 6. There is an error in Elder's equation (5). It should be read as our equation (5). The initial minus was omitted in Elder's paper.
These first order conditions differ from (2)-(4) in that SR replaces S, which is no longer a choice variable.
Since the production function is strictly concave, the second order sufficient conditions are met. Hence, equations (10) and (11) can be solved for
L(SR, C,r,p,b).
Totally differentiating ( 10) and ( 11) + w'a' + b) . 7 Since H > 0, p > 0, XKL > 0, and XKK < 0, the sign of aKj asR and aL; asR is determined by the sign of V. Under safety regulation, and in absence of regulation
Assuming b is constant,
V R-V* = C[a'(S*)-a'(SR)] + [w'(a(S*))][a'(S*)]-[w'(a(SR))][a'(SR)] is negative since a'(SR) > a'(S*) and w'(a(SR)) > w'(a(S*)).
Hence, V R < 0, and the firm reduces output and factor employment when faced with workplace safety regulation.
7. Note that V = rrsL = rrLS• as obtained from the second order conditions. Equivalently, V = rrs/ L. 8. In Elder's equation ( 12), the minus sign should be omitted. On the other hand, a minus sign should be added to equation (13).
III. Conclusion
We have illustrated how Elder's theoretical model of the effects of safety regulation should have developed. In Elder's paper, the intuitively correct results were obtained through a series of offsetting errors. Our respecification simply strengthens Elder's theoretical and empirical results. We believe that alternative specifications of the model (such as, consider ing joint production, or explicitly including safety as a factor input in production) would produce qualitatively similar results. In the empirical section, Elder has employed CES cost functions instead of a more flexible functional form. Relaxing this assumption could affect measured values of the elasticity of substitution of K and L between periods, however, the conclusion that safety affects factor choices and reduces output would remain unaltered.
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